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Abstract
In many situations a decision maker has incomplete psychological preferences, and
the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) is often violated. In this paper we
relax WARP, and replace it with convex axiom of revealed non-inferiority (CARNI).
An alternative x is revealed inferior to y if x is never chosen when y is in the convex
hull of the choice set. CARNI requires that an alternative is chosen if it is not inferior
to all other alternatives in the convex hull of the choice set. We apply CARNI in
two models and axiomatize non-binary choice correspondences. In the ﬁrst model we
impose the standard axioms of expected utility model, except that WARP is replaced
by CARNI. We prove that it has a multiple-utility representation: There is a unique
convex set of vN-M utilities, such that an alternative is chosen if and only if it is
best with respect to one of the utilities in this set. In the second model we impose
the axioms of the subjective expected utility, relax WARP in a similar way, and get
multiple-prior representation: There is a unique convex set of priors over the state
of nature, such that an alternative is chosen if and only if it is best with respect to
one of these priors. Both representations are closely-related to psychological insights
of justiﬁable choice: The decision maker has several ways to evaluate acts, each
with a diﬀerent justiﬁcation. Observable payoﬀ-irrelevant information during the
choice triggers her to use a speciﬁc anchoring justiﬁcation for the evaluation of the
alternatives.
Key words: uncertainty, multiple priors, multiple utilities, incomplete preferences,
anchoring, framing, non-binary choice. JEL classiﬁcation: D81
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1 Introduction
Most existing models of rational choice under risk and uncertainty assume
that the decision maker (DM) has complete psychological preferences over
all alternatives. 2 That is, every two alternatives are comparable: either they
are equivalent or one of them is inferior to the other. As argued by Aumann
([3]), Bewely ([6]), Mandler ([28]), and Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok ([9]), among
others, rationality does not imply completeness. The psychological preferences
may be incomplete, thereby allowing for the occasional indecisiveness of the
DM. For example, this is usually the case when the DM has diﬀerent objective
functions (multi-criteria decision making).
Mounting evidence from the psychological literature indicates that when the
psychological preferences are incomplete, her choice relies on justiﬁcations
(rationales). Speciﬁcally, the DM has several ways to evaluate alternatives,
each with a diﬀerent justiﬁcation, and additional payoﬀ-irrelevant information
that is observable or available during the choice determines which justiﬁcation
is used. The chosen alternative is the best with respect to this justiﬁcation.
Some examples for justiﬁable choice are: (1) Availability heuristics (Tversky
and Kahneman, [41]) - DMs base their predictions on how easily examples
can be brought to mind. (2) Framing eﬀect (Tversky and Kahneman, [42]) -
The way the choice problem is presented inﬂuences the way the DM evaluates
alternatives. (3) Anchoring ([41]) - DMs overly rely on speciﬁc information
or a speciﬁc value, and adjust their evaluations accordingly. (4) Reason-based
Choice (Shaﬁr, Simonson and Tversky, [39]) - DMs often seek and construct
reasons in order to justify their choices to themselves and to others.
Justiﬁcations inﬂuence choice over incomparable alternatives in two main as-
pects: (1) Taste-justiﬁcations inﬂuence the tastes of the DM over the diﬀerent
consequences. (2) Belief-justiﬁcations inﬂuence the belief of the DM over the
unknown state of nature.
One example of taste-justiﬁcations is the regret considerations that were an-
alyzed in Zeelenberg et al. ([45]). The participants in their experiments had
to choose between a safe lottery and a risky lottery. A matching procedure
ensured that these gambles were roughly of equal attractiveness when there
was a feedback only for the chosen lottery. The results show that having a
feedback on the risky lottery (also when it is not chosen) causes people to
choose it more often due to regret considerations. A similar phenomena oc-
curs in real-life in the Dutch postal code lottery (Zeelenberg and Pieters, [46]),
where one's postcode is the ticket number, and hence even if not participating
one may still ﬁnd out that one would have won had one played.
2 We use the term psychological preferences to describe the DM's judgment of her
welfare. See Mandler ([28]) for a discussion of the diﬀerence between psychological
preferences and revealed preferences that are observed by choice behavior.
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Wright and Bower ([44]) demonstrate belief-justiﬁcations that depend on the
DM's mood. In their experiments happy or sad moods were induced by having
the subject focus on particularly happy or sad personal experiences. They
show that the induced mood inﬂuence the evaluation of ambiguous events.
Relative to control subjects, happy people are optimistic i.e., they report
higher probabilities for positive ambiguous events and lower probabilities for
negative events. Conversely, sad people are pessimistic.
We model the choices of the DM by a choice correspondence C, which selects
in each closed and non-empty set of alternatives A, a non-empty subset of
choosable alternatives - C (A). That is, when the DM faces a choice from the
alternatives in A, she may choose any of the alternatives in C (A). The weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP) is often violated when the psycholog-
ical presences are incomplete. For example, if x and y are two incomparable
alternatives, and x′ is a bit better than x, then it is plausible that only x′ and
y (but not x) are chosen from the three alternatives, which violates WARP. 3
Eliaz and Ok ([10]) present a weakening of WARP that is more appropriate
to incomplete psychological preferences. An alternative x is revealed inferior
to y (according to [10]'s deﬁnition), if x is not chosen in any set that includes
y. Their weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority (WARNI ) requires that an
alternative is chosen if it is not revealed inferior to any chosen alternative.
WARNI implies that the choice correspondence is binary. 4 However, the use
of justiﬁcations and incomplete preferences often induces non-binary choice
correspondence, as in the following example of taste-justiﬁcations. Let {x, y, z}
be 3 restaurants, where x always oﬀers hamburger, y always oﬀers chicken,
and z randomly oﬀers either hamburger, chicken or ﬁsh. Assume that Alice is
indecisive about hamburger and chicken (her choice between them depends on
taste-justiﬁcations), and that she prefers both of them a bit more than ﬁsh. It
is plausible that when only restaurants x and z are available Alice sometimes
chooses z (when she has a taste-justiﬁcation for chicken), and similarly that
Alice sometimes chooses z when only y and z are available, but she never
chooses z when all three alternatives are available (she chooses either x or y
depending on her taste-justiﬁcation).
In this paper we present a convex variation of WARNI that captures this kind
of justiﬁable choice with incomplete preferences. We say that an alternative
3 Recall that WARP requires that if x and y are two alternatives in the intersection
of two sets, x is chosen in the ﬁrst set and y is chosen in the second set, then both
alternatives are chosen in both sets. In the example above, both x and y are in the
intersection of {x, y} and {x, y, x′}, x is chosen in the ﬁrst set, y is chosen in the
second set, but x is not chosen in the second set.
4 A choice correspondence C is binary if there exists a binary relation  such that
C maximizes . This is equivalent to requiring that an alternative is chosen in a set
if and only if it is chosen in any couple in the set.
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x is revealed inferior to y, if x is never chosen when y is in the convex hull of
the choice set. The convex axiom of revealed non-inferiority (CARNI) requires
that an alternative is chosen if it is not revealed inferior to any alternative in
the convex hull of the chosen acts. Observe that CARNI is implied by WARP
together with the independence axiom.
CARNI implies that the choices of the DM are based on pair-wise comparisons
to alternatives in the convex hull of the choice set. There are three reasons for
this kind of comparisons, which are demonstrated by the rejection of z in the
choice set {x, y, z} in the example above:
(1) We assume that each justiﬁcation triggers a complete linear ordering 
(an ordering that satisﬁes the independence axiom, and is consistent with
the incomplete psychological preferences) over the alternatives, and that
the chosen alternative is the maximal according to this ordering. The fact
that ﬁsh are inferior to the other main dishes (or more generally that z is
inferior to a mixture of x and y) implies that z cannot maximize  (the
linearity of the ordering implies that y  z or x  z). That is, there is
no justiﬁcation that can support the choice of z.
(2) The fact that a random choice between x and y is strictly preferred over
z triggers Alice to consider the pair {x, y} as strictly better then z, and
to limit her choice to either x or y, even if her ﬁnal choice between x and
y would be deterministic.
(3) If Alice may face the same choice problem again in the future, then re-
peated choices of z are strictly worse than some combination of repeated
choices of x and y. 5 This again triggers Alice to limit her choice to the
pair {x, y}.
In this paper we apply CARNI in two axiomatic models of justiﬁable choice:
the ﬁrst model describes taste-justiﬁcations, and the second one describes
belief-justiﬁcations. In both models we impose standard axioms, and replace
WARP with CARNI.
The ﬁrst model is in a von Newman-Morgenstern framework ([43]), where
each alternative is a lottery over a ﬁnite set of consequences. The expected
utility model assumes that the choice correspondence satisﬁes four axioms:
non-triviality, continuity, independence and WARP. We adopt the ﬁrst three
axioms, and replace WARP with CARNI. Theorem 1 shows that this axiom-
atization is equivalent to the following representation: There exists a unique
(up to linear transformations) convex and closed set U of aﬃne (vN-M) utility
functions, such that for every set A and every lottery x, x is chosen in A if
and only if it is the best lottery with respect to one of the utilities in U :
x ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U u (x) ≥ u (y) ∀y ∈ A
5 Assuming that Alice's total utility from a sequence of choices is the a discounted
sum of the utilities in each choice, with a discount factor closed enough to 1.
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The second model is in an Anscombe-Aumann framework ([2]), where each act
(alternative) is a function that assigns a lottery in each state of nature. The
subjective expected utility model assumes that the choices satisfy ﬁve axioms:
non-triviality, monotonicity, continuity, independence and WARP. We adopt
the ﬁrst four axioms, and replace WARP with two weaker axioms: CARNI, and
weak axiom of revealed unambiguous preferences. The latter axiom requires
that the weak axiom is satisﬁed over unambiguous (constant) acts. That is,
the DM has complete psychological preferences over these acts. Theorem 2
shows that this axiomatization is equivalent to the following representation:
There exists a unique (up to linear transformations) aﬃne (vN-M) utility u,
and a unique convex set P of priors (probability distributions over the state
of nature), such that for every set A and every act f , f is chosen in A if and
only if it is the best act with respect to one of the priors in the set:
f ∈ C(A)⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ P Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) ∀g ∈ A
The interpretation of both representations is in the spirit of the psychological
insights mentioned earlier: The DM has several ways to evaluate alternatives,
each with a diﬀerent justiﬁcation. Each justiﬁcation triggers the DM to base
her evaluation on a speciﬁc anchoring utility (prior), that is determined by
the observable payoﬀ-irrelevant information during her choice.
Both representations extend existing models of preferences: the ﬁrst represen-
tation extends multiple-utility preferences (Dubra et al., [9]), and the second
representation extends Knightian preferences (Bewely, [6]; Lehrer and Teper,
[23]). Our models coincide with the existing models for choice over binary sets.
However, when there is a larger (non-convex) choice set, the binary choice cor-
respondences that are induced by the existing preferences imply the choice of
unjustiﬁed acts, which are not best with respect to any of the utilities or
priors. The contribution of our paper is the addition of CARNI to the original
list of axioms, 6 which gives a non-binary choice correspondence that is more
appropriate to the psychological insights about justiﬁable choice.
One can use CARNI to extend other axiomatizations of binary preferences
into axiomatizations of non-binary justiﬁable choice correspondences. Ok, Or-
toleva and Riella ([31]) present an axiomatization for a preference that is
represented by either multiple priors or multiple utilities, and a few axiomati-
zations of multiple state-dependent utilities. Seidenfeld, Scharvish and Kadane
([36]) present an axiomatization for a preference that is represented by a set
of pairs of state-dependent utilities/priors. 7 It is possible to add CARNI to
each of these axiomatic models and get the appropriate justiﬁable choice rep-
6 Where each existing axiom is adapted in the obvious way to relate to the choice
correspondence instead of the preference relation.
7 The utilities of the extreme pairs in [36]'s representation are almost state-
independent.
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resentation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the models and the re-
sults. Diﬀerent aspects of our model, and its relations to the existing literature
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 includes the proofs.
2 Models and Results
2.1 Taste-Justiﬁcations
2.1.1 Preliminaries
LetX be a ﬁnite set of outcomes (certain prizes). 8 Let Y = 4 (X) be the set of
lotteries over X. The mixture (convex combination) of two lotteries is deﬁned
as follows: (αy + (1− α) z) (x) = αy (x) + (1− α) z (x) (where α ∈ [0, 1],
y, z ∈ Y and x ∈ X). Similarly, given A ⊆ Y , let αy + (1− α)A denote
the set where each z ∈ A is replaced by αy + (1 − α)z: (αy + (1− α)A) =
{αy + (1− α)z|z ∈ A}.
The primitive of the model is a choice correspondence C over Y. The domain
of C is all the non-empty closed sets in Y. 9 For each such set A ⊆ Y , C (A) is
a non-empty subset of A. The interpretation of C is the following: when a DM
faces a choice from the acts in A, she chooses one of the acts in C (A), and
each act in C (A) might be chosen. That is, the DM considers all the acts in
C (A), and only them, as choosable acts. The choice of a speciﬁc act in C (A)
is not explicitly modeled. 10 When y ∈ C(A) we say the y is choosable in A,
or that the DM (sometimes) chooses y in A, and similarly when y /∈ C(A) we
say the y is not choosable in A, or that the DM does not choose y in A. Given
A ⊆ Y , conv (A) denotes the convex hull of A (the smallest convex set that
contains A).
2.1.2 Axioms
The following axioms (assumptions) are imposed on the choice correspondence:
A1 Non-triviality. There is a lottery y ∈ A ⊆ Y such that y 6∈ C(A).
8 We deﬁne X to be ﬁnite for simplicity of presentation. Both of our models can be
easily extended to compact metric space by adapting the proofs a la Dubra et al.
([9]) and Gilboa et al. ([16]).
9 We deﬁne C only on closed sets because in non-closed sets the Pareto frontier
might be an empty set. Our results remain the same if C is deﬁned only on ﬁnite
(non-empty) sets.
10 In the model's interpretation the choice of a speciﬁc act in C (A) depends on the
payoﬀ-irrelevant information that is observable during the choice.
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A2 Continuity. For any lottery y ∈ A, the set {z ∈ Y |z ∈ C ({y, z})} is closed,
and the set {z ∈ Y | {z} = C ({y, z})} is open.
A3 Independence. Let y ∈ A ⊆ Y , z ∈ Y and α ∈ (0, 1). y ∈ C (A) ⇔
αz + (1− α) y ∈ C (αz + (1− α)A).
A4 Convex Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority (CARNI). Let y ∈ A ⊆ Y . If
for every z ∈ conv (C(A)) there exists a set B ⊆ Y with y ∈ C (B) and
z ∈ conv (B), then y ∈ C(A).
Axioms A1-A3 are standard. Axiom A1 requires that C is not trivial (there
is a choice set with at least one unchoosable act). Axiom A2 (continuity) is
standard. It is equivalent to the requirement that for any lottery y ∈ A, the
sets {z|z  y} and {z|z  y} are closed, where  is the revealed preference
relation: f  g ⇔ f ∈ C (f, g) .
Assume that Alice is going to choose lottery y in A, when she ﬁnds out that
there is some probability that event E occurs, and in that case she will have to
take lottery z. Axiom A3 (independence) requires Alice to choose the mixture
of y and z in the new choice problem (the mixture of A and z). That is, to
choose lottery y if E does not occur. Observe that violating independence is
time-inconsistent.
Most models that generalize expected utility (such as, Machina, [27]) and
subjective expected utility (such as, [14,15,26,35]), choose to weaken the in-
dependence axiom (and keep WARP). Some support for the independence
axiom is found in Raﬃa's ([32]) results: most people that violate the indepen-
dence axiom in Ellsberg's paradox, change their choices when presented with
an analysis that shows that their original choices counter the independence
axiom. Luce and von Winterfeldt ([25]) discuss the experimental violations
of the independence axiom in the literature, and show that they are mostly
caused by the violation of the assumption of reduction of compound lotteries
to normal form, which is implicitly assumed in the existing models (mentioned
above) that weaken the independence axiom.
The weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) requires that if both lotteries
y, z are in A ∩ B, x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(B). Axioms A1-A3
and WARP imply expected utility representation ([43]): There exists a unique
aﬃne (vN-M) utility function u, such that the chosen lotteries are the best
according to u. That is, for every closed set A ⊆ L and every lottery y ∈ A:
y ∈ C(A)⇔ u (y) ≥ u (z) ∀z ∈ A
In our axiomatization we replace WARP with the weaker CARNI. With an
eye to this relaxation we formulate WARP slightly diﬀerently:
WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) - Let y ∈ A ⊆ Y . If there exists
z ∈ C(A) and B ⊆ Y such that y ∈ C (B) and z ∈ B, then y ∈ C(A).
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WARP is appropriate when the psychological preferences of the DM are com-
plete. In such cases, y ∈ C (B) and z ∈ B imply that y is revealed to be
weakly-superior to z (i.e., y is as good as z). Thus if z is chosen in A so does
y. When the psychological preferences are incomplete, there is a diﬀerence be-
tween something being superior and it being non-inferior for a DM. Observe
that given the independence axiom, WARP is also equivalent to the following
convex formulation:
WARP (equivalent convex formulation) - Let y ∈ A ⊆ Y . If there exists
z ∈ conv (C(A)) and B ⊆ Y such that y ∈ C (B) and z ∈ conv (B), then
y ∈ C(A).
Eliaz and Ok ([10]) propose the following axiom:
WARNI (Weak Axiom of Revealed non-inferiority) - Let y ∈ A ⊆ Y . If for
every z ∈ C(A) there exists a set B ⊆ Y with y ∈ C (B) and z ∈ B, then
y ∈ C(A).
When the psychological preferences are incomplete, y ∈ C (B) and z ∈ B
only imply that y is revealed non-inferior to z, but it is not necessary that
y is weakly-superior to z. WARNI requires that if y is revealed non-inferior
to all the chosen alternatives in A, then it must be chosen from A as well.
As discussed in the introduction, in some choice situations, it seems more
appropriate to require the convex variation of WARNI, where a chosen act
has to be non-inferior to all acts in the convex hull of A. This requirement is
captured by CARNI, which requires that if y is revealed non-inferior to all the
alternatives in conv (C (A)), then it must be chosen in A as well. CARNI is
especially appealing when the DM follows the independence axiom, and the
justiﬁcation completes her psychological preferences into a linear ordering.
2.1.3 Representation Theorem
Replacing WARP with CARNI yields the following representation.
Theorem 1 Let C be a choice correspondence over Y . The following are
equivalent:
(1) C satisﬁes axioms A1-A4 (non-triviality, continuity, independence and
CARNI).
(2) There exists a convex and closed set U of aﬃne (vN-M) utility functions,
such that for every closed set A ⊆ L and every lottery y ∈ A:
y ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U, u (y) ≥ u (z) ∀z ∈ A
That is, a lottery is chosen if and only if it is the best with respect to one
of the utilities in U . Moreover:
(a) U is unique up to linear transformations . That is, if both U and V are
convex and closed sets that represent the same choice correspondence
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then ∀u ∈ U, ∃v ∈ V such that u = a · v+ b where a > 0 and b ∈ R.
(b) There are two outcomes x, x ∈ X such that ∀u ∈ U , u (x) < u (x).
2.2 Belief-justiﬁcations
2.2.1 Preliminaries
In this model we follow the framework of Anscombe-Aumann ([2], as refor-
mulated in Fishburn, [12]). Similar to the ﬁrst model, X is a ﬁnite set of
outcomes and Y = 4 (X) is the set of lotteries. Let S be a ﬁnite set of states
of nature, and, abusing notation, let S = |S|. Let L = Y S be the set of all
functions from states of nature to lotteries. Such functions are referred to as
acts. Endow this set with the product topology, where the topology on Y
is the relative topology inherited from [0, 1]X . Abusing notation, for an act
f ∈ L and a state s ∈ S, we denote by f (s) the constant (unambiguous)
act that assigns the lottery f(s) to every state of nature. Similarly for a set
A ⊆ L and a state s ∈ S, let A (s) denote the act-wise set of constant acts:
A (s) = {f (s) |f ∈ A}.
Mixtures (convex combinations) of acts are performed point-wise. In particular
if f, g ∈ L and α ∈ [0, 1], then (αf + (1− α)g) (s) = αf (s) + (1− α)g (s) for
every s ∈ S. Similarly, Let (αf + (1− α)A) denote the set where each g ∈ A
is replaced by αf + (1− α)g: (αf + (1− α)A) = {αf + (1− α)g|g ∈ A}. As
in the former model, the primitive is a choice correspondence C over L. The
domain of C is all the non-empty closed sets in L. For each such set A ⊆ L,
C (A) is a non-empty subset of A.
2.2.2 Axioms
The following six axioms are imposed on the choice correspondence:
B0 Monotonicity. Let f ∈ A ⊆ L. ∀s ∈ S, {f(s)} = C (A(s))⇒ {f} = C(A).
B1 Non-triviality. There is an act f ∈ A ⊆ L such that f 6∈ C(A).
B2 Continuity. For any act f ∈ L, the set {g ∈ L|g ∈ C (f, g)} is closed, and
the set {g ∈ L| {g} = C ({f, g})} is open.
B3 Independence. Let f ∈ A ⊆ L, h ∈ L and α ∈ (0, 1). f ∈ C (A) ⇐⇒
αh+ (1− α) f ∈ C (αh+ (1− α)A).
B4 Convex Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority (CARNI). Let f ∈ A ⊆ L. If
for every g ∈ conv (C(A)) there exists a set B ⊆ L with f ∈ C (B) and
g ∈ Conv (B), then f ∈ C(A).
B5 Weak Axiom of Revealed Unambiguous Preferences (WARUP). LetA,B ⊆
Y and y, z ∈ A ∩B. y ∈ C(A) and z ∈ C(B) implies that y ∈ C(B).
Axioms B0-B3 are all standard. We say that an act f dominates the set A if
for every state of nature s ∈ S {f (s)} = C (A (s)). That is, for every state
of nature s, if the DM knows s, she would uniquely choose act f. Axiom B0
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(monotonicity) requires that if f dominates the set A then it is uniquely chosen
in A. Axioms B1-B3 are analog to axioms A1-A3, which have been discussed
in the ﬁrst model.
Axioms B0-B3 andWARP imply the subjective expected utility representation
([34], [2]): There exists a unique aﬃne (vN-M) utility function u, and a unique
probability distribution (prior) p over the states of nature, such that for every
closed set A ⊆ L and every act f ∈ A:
f ∈ C(A)⇐⇒ Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) ∀g ∈ A
That is f is the best act according to the prior p (and the utility u).
In our axiomatization we replace WARP with two weaker axioms: CARNI (B4)
and WARUP (B5). CARNI has been discussed in the ﬁrst model. WARUP
requires WARP to be satisﬁed only on unambiguous (constant) acts. That is,
if y, z are two acts in the intersection of two sets, where both sets only include
constant acts, then if y is chosen in the ﬁrst set and z is chosen in the second
set, then y must be chosen also in the second set.
2.2.3 Representation Theorem
Replacing WARP with CARNI and WARUP yields the following Theorem :
Theorem 2 Let C be a choice correspondence over L. The following are
equivalent:
(1) C satisﬁes axioms B0-B5.
(2) There exists a unique non-degenerate aﬃne (vN-M) utility function u,
and a unique set P ⊆ 4 (S) of probability distributions (priors) over S ,
such that for every closed set A ⊆ L and every act f ∈ A:
f ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃p ∈ P, s.t. Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) ∀g ∈ A
That is, an act is chosen if and only it is best according to one of the priors
in P (and the utility u).
3 Discussion
3.1 Primitive of the Model and Binariness
In most existing literature, the primitive of the model of rational choice under
uncertainty is a preference order ([2,6,15,16,21,26,35]). This implicitly assumes
that the choice correspondence of a rational DM is induced from a binary
preference relation. That is, f ∈ C(A) ⇔ ∀g ∈ A f  g, where  is the
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revealed preference: f  g ⇔ f ∈ C ({f, g}). In this paper we demonstrate
why this assumption may be too strong in situations when the psychological
preferences of the DM are incomplete, and why the primitive of the model
should be a non-binary choice correspondence, in which the choices of the DM
over the couples in a set A do not determine her choice in A.
Examples for other models with non-binary choice in the literature include the
social choice models of Batra and Pattanaik ([4]) and Deb ([8]) and Nehring
[30]'s model for preference relation between an act and a set of acts. The
choice correspondence in our models has a global binariness property that is
not shared by the existing models mentioned above: the choices of the DM
over all the couples in the global set L (or at-least over all the couples in
conv(A)) determine her choices in A.
3.2 Properties of CARNI
Luce and Raiﬀa ([24, 13.3]) present a list of 9 reasonable axioms for a rational
choice correspondence under uncertainty. Satisfying all of them is equivalent
to the subjective expected utility model ([34]). Our second model satisﬁes all
of these axioms except the convexity of the chosen acts: if both acts f and g
are chosen in A, and αf + (1− α) g is an element of A, then αf + (1− α) g
is chosen in A. The following example demonstrates why this violation is
plausible. Let |S| = 2, and f, g, h ∈ L three acts with the following vN-M
utilities: u (f) = (1, 0), u (g) = (0, 1) and u (h) = (0.6, 0.6). Assume that the
DM considers all priors to be possible. Let A = {f, g, h, 0.5f + 0.5g}. It is
plausible that both f, g ∈ C (A) as the DM believes that the probability of
either state of nature may be high, and there are justiﬁcations to choose both
acts. However, it is not rational to choose 0.5f + 0.5g because it has utility
(0.5, 0.5), which is strictly dominated by h.
In a dynamic environment in which the DM faces at each stage a new choice
problem, violating the weak axiom (by following CARNI) may make the DM
vulnerable to money-pumps. This can be avoided if the choice from the choos-
able alternatives at each stage are based on a status-quo justiﬁcation: The DM
is triggered to evaluate alternatives according to utilities (or priors) that are
consistent with his past choices. This kind of behavior has strong empirical
support in the psychological literature. A closely related formal model (for
belief justiﬁcation) is found in Bewley ([6]).
In some choice situations the DM can always base her choice on a random
device. This can be modeled by deﬁning the choice correspondence C only
over convex (non-empty and closed) sets. That is, when the DM supposedly
faces a choice in A, her ability to use a random device enlarges her set of
alternatives to conv (A). In such a setup, CARNI is equivalent to WARNI,
and all of our results remain the same.
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3.3 Decomposition of CARNI
CARNI can be decomposed into four independent axioms. That is, a choice
correspondence satisﬁes CARNI if and only if it satisfy the following 4 axioms:
E1 Contraction (Sen's property α) - A ⊆ B, f ∈ C(B)⇒ f ∈ C(A).
E2 Irrelevant acts invariant (Aizerman's property) - A ⊆ B, C (B) ⊆ A ⇒
C (A) ⊆ C (B).
E3 Convex Expansion - ∪An is convex, f ∈ ∩An, and ∀n f ∈ C (An)⇒f ∈
C (∪An).
E4 Invariance to mixtures - f ∈ C (A)⇒ f ∈ C (conv (A)).
Axiom E1 requires that if an alternative is chosen in some set, it must also
be chosen also in a smaller subset. It implies that the two possible deﬁnitions
of revealed preferences coincide: f  g ⇔ f ∈ C ({f, g}) ⇔ ∃A, s.t. g ∈ A
and f ∈ C (A). Axiom E2 requires that choice is invariant to the addition
of irrelevant (=unchosen) alternatives in the following sense: if f is chosen in
some set, and the choice set is extended such that all the new alternatives
are not chosen, then f must be chosen in the larger set. Sen ([38]) showed
that Axioms E1 + E2 imply that the revealed preference is quasi-transitive
(that is: f  g, g  h ⇒ f  h). Aizerman and Malishevski ([1]) showed that
when the grand set is ﬁnite, axioms E1+E2 are equivalent to the following
representation: there is a set of orderings, such that an alternative is chosen if
and only if it maximizes one of the orderings.
The standard expansion axiom requires that if an alternative is chosen in some
sets, then it must also be chosen in the union of these sets:
E3' Standard expansion - f ∈ ∩An, ∀n f ∈ C (An)⇒f ∈ C (∪An)
Axiom E3 limits this requirement only for convex sets.Aizerman and Mali-
shevski showed (when the grand set is ﬁnite) that a choice correspondence sat-
isﬁes axioms E1+E2+E3' if and only if it is rationalized by a quasi-transitive
relation. Eliaz and Ok had presented an axiom, WARNI, which is equivalent
to these three axioms.
Axiom E4 requires that choice is invariant to the addition of mixtures. That
is, if an alternative is chosen in some set, then it must be chosen when a mix-
ture of existing alternatives is added to the choice set. Seidenfeld, Schervish
and Kadane ([37]) have recently presented an axiomatic model for choice un-
der uncertainty, where they require axioms E1, E2 and E4 (but not E3), in
addition to some standard axioms (non-triviality, continuity, independence,
monotonicity and domination), and get a representation where the set of jus-
tiﬁcations (pairs of state dependent utilities/priors in [37]) is non-convex. The
addition of axiom E3 implies the convexity of the set of justiﬁcations.
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3.4 Attitude to Uncertainty
Consider the following example: |S| = 2, X = {x, x}, x = C (x, x), f =
(0.5x+ 0.5x, 0.5x+ 0.5x) and g = (x, x). Act f gives unambiguous proba-
bility 0.5 to get the better outcome x, while f gives x with the ambiguous
probability that state 2 occurs. Assume that P , the set of possible priors,
includes (0.5, 0.5).
Gilboa and Schmeidler's model ([15]) predicts that people would strictly prefer
f over g, i.e., people are uncertainty averse, as experimentally observed in
Ellsberg's paradox. Our model of belief-justiﬁcations predicts that both acts
are choosable, and that the attitude to uncertainty depends on the relevant
justiﬁcation. An experimental support for this prediction is found in Heath
and Tversky ([17]), where it is shown that people may be uncertainty averse
or uncertainty-seekers, and that it depends on payoﬀ-irrelevant observable
information. Speciﬁcally, people prefer ambiguous events over equiprobable
chance events when they consider themselves knowledgeable in the area that
is the source of the uncertainty, and they prefer chance events when they
consider themselves ignorant or uninformed.
3.5 Relation with Equilibrium Notions in the Learning Literature
Conjectural equilibrium (Battigalli, 1987) is a solution concept that extends
Nash equilibrium in the learning literature. 11 In such an equilibrium each
player receives some partial information regarding the action proﬁle played
by the other players (such as information how similar players have played
in similar games in the past). This provides a player with a set of possible
strategy proﬁles that the others might play (the proﬁles that are consistent
with his partial information). In equilibrium each player plays an action that
is the best response to one of the possible strategy proﬁles (and the chosen
action proﬁle is consistent with the information of the players).
The behavior of the players in such equilibria is usually modeled by subjective
expected utility. However, it can also be modeled by belief-justiﬁcations: The
state of the world captures uncertainty about both nature and the actions of
the other players. Each player has a set of possible priors, and she chooses an
action that is optimal given one of the priors in this set. 12 This alternative
modeling may sometimes have a more appealing interpretation. For example,
11 Closely related solution concepts are Fudenberg and Levine's [13] self-conﬁrming
equilibrium and Kalai and Lehrer's [19] subjective equilibrium.
12 In our model we assume that the set of priors is convex. This assumptions holds,
in most applications of conjectural equilibrium, where each player knows the distri-
bution of some part of the action proﬁle, or more generally, each player knows the
expected value of some random variables that depend on the action proﬁle.
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consider the case where all players share symmetric information about the ac-
tion proﬁle. Subjective expected utility model requires that each player would
have a diﬀerent prior, and that players are not aware about the priors of the
other players. Contrary to that, belief-justiﬁcation model allows the players
to share a common set of possible priors (and to use private payoﬀ-irrelevant
information to choose a speciﬁc anchoring prior).
3.6 Related Literature
In our models, choices are derived from multiple justiﬁcations (rationales) with
the following properties: (1) Each justiﬁcation is represented by an ordering.
(2) The chosen acts are best with respect to one of the justiﬁcations. (3)
Each justiﬁcation may be used in all choice problems. Some related models
for choice with multiple justiﬁcations are:
• Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler ([20]) - The DM has several justiﬁcations,
and each of them is used in a disjoint subset of choice problems.
• Manzini and Mariotti ([29]) - The DM has several justiﬁcations that are
used sequentially in a ﬁxed order. Each justiﬁcation is represented by an
incomplete preference relation.
• Rubinstein and Salant ([33]) - The DM has a set of justiﬁcations, and she
uses one of the justiﬁcations according to the framing of the choice problem
(such as the order in which the acts are presented).
• Cherpanov, Feddersen and Sandroni ([7]) - The DM has several justiﬁca-
tions, but only one preference relation. The chosen act is the most preferred
among all the justiﬁable acts.
Unlike these models, we work with a more structured framework and this
allows us to impose more structure on the justiﬁcations: the set of justiﬁcations
is convex and closed, and each justiﬁcation is a linear ordering.
4 Proofs
4.1 Taste-Justiﬁcations
In this subsection we prove Theorem 1. We have to show that axioms A1-
A4 (non-triviality, continuity, independence and CARNI) are suﬃcient for
the representation of taste-justiﬁcations. The other direction is immediate.
Let  denote the revealed strict preference relation that is induced from C:
y  z ⇔ {y} = C ({y, z}) (y 6= z). The following lemma shows the global
(convex) binariness property of C.
Lemma 3 Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes CARNI. For each
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y ∈ A ⊆ Y , y ∈ C (A)⇔ ¬∃z ∈ conv(A) s.t. z  y
PROOF. ⇒ part: Let y ∈ C (A) and z ∈ conv (A). Assume to the contrary
that z  y s⇒ {z} = C ({y, z}) . This implies (by CARNI) that for every
B ⊆ Y with z ∈ conv (B), y /∈ C (B). Speciﬁcally y 6∈ C (A) (a contradiction).
⇐ part: Let y ∈ A\C (A). This implies (by CARNI) that there is z ∈
conv (C (A)) ⊆ conv (A) such that for every B ⊆ Y with z ∈ conv (B),
y 6∈ C (B). Speciﬁcally, y /∈ C ({y, z})⇒z  y.
The following lemma shows that  satisﬁes transitivity, non-triviality, conti-
nuity and independence.
Lemma 4 Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes axioms A1-A4, and
let  be the revealed strict preference. Then  satisﬁes the following properties:
C1 Non-triviality - There are y, z ∈ Y such that y  z.
C2 Continuity - For each y ∈ Y the sets {z|z  y} and {z|z ≺ y} are open.
C3 Independence - For any y, z, w ∈ Y and any α ∈ (0, 1): y  z implies
αw + (1− α) y  αw + (1− α) z
C4 Transitivity - For any y, z, w ∈ Y : y  z and z  w implies that y  w.
PROOF. Axioms C1-C3 are immediately implied from the analog properties
of C (A1-A3) and from lemma 3. C4 (transitivity) is proven as follows. Let
y  z and z  w. By lemma 3 w, z /∈ C ({y, z, w}). This implies {y} =
C ({y, z, w}). Assume to the contrary that w ∈ C ({w, y}). CARNI implies
that w ∈ C ({y, z, w}) and we get a contradiction.
The following proposition shows that  has a unique multiple utility repre-
sentation. The proposition is a direct adaptation of the results of Dubra et al.
for weak preference relation (). The proof, which is very similar to [9, Sect.
4], is omitted.
Proposition 5 Let  be a strict binary relation over Y . The following are
equivalent:
(1)  satisﬁes axioms C1-C4 (transitivity, non-triviality, continuity and in-
dependence).
(2) There exists a convex and closed set U of aﬃne (vN-M) utility functions,
such that for every two lotteries y, z ∈ Y :
y  z ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ U, u (y) > u (z)
Moreover:
(a) U is unique up to linear transformations. That is if both U and V are
convex and closed sets that represent the same choice correspondence
then ∀u ∈ U, ∃v ∈ V such that u = a · v+ b where a > 0 and b ∈ R.
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(b) There are two outcomes x, x ∈ X such that ∀u ∈ U , u (x) < u (x)
We use Prop. 5 to ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 1, by showing that axioms A1-
A4 are suﬃcient for the taste-justiﬁcation representation. Let C be a choice
correspondence that satisﬁes these axioms, and let  be the revealed strict
preference. Let U be the unique (up to linear transformations) convex and
closed set of utilities of Prop. 5. We have to show for each y ∈ A ⊆ Y ,
y ∈ C (A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U, s.t. u (y) ≥ u (z) ∀z ∈ A. This is done as follows:
y ∈ C (A)⇐⇒¬∃z ∈ conv(A) s.t. z  y (1)
⇐⇒∀z ∈ conv(A) ∃u ∈ U such thatu (y) ≥ u (z) (2)
⇐⇒ min
z∈conv(A)
max
u∈U
(u (y)− u (z)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒max
u∈U
min
z∈conv(A)
(u (y)− u (z)) ≥ 0 (3)
⇐⇒∃u ∈ U such that ∀z ∈ conv(A), u (y) ≥ u (z) (4)
⇐⇒∃u ∈ U such that ∀z ∈ A, u (y) ≥ u (z)
Where (6) is implied by lemma 3, (7) is due to Prop. 5, (8) is implied by a by
Sion's Minimax Theorem ([40]), and (4) is implied by the linearity of u.
4.2 Belief-Justiﬁcations
In this subsection we prove Theorem 2. We have to show that axioms B0-B5
are suﬃcient for the representation of belief-justiﬁcations. The other direction
is immediate. Let  denote the revealed strict preference that is induced from
C. Observe that lemma 3 is valid in this framework as well, and thus CARNI
implies that ∀f ∈ A ⊆ L:
f ∈ C (A)⇔ ¬∃g ∈ conv(A) s.t. g  f (5)
The following proposition shows that  satisﬁes monotonicity, non-triviality,
continuity, independence, transitivity and complete-transitivity over unam-
biguous acts .
Lemma 6 Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes axioms B0-B5, and
let  be the revealed strict preferences. Then  satisﬁes the following proper-
ties:
D0 Monotonicity. Let f, g ∈ L. ∀s ∈ S f(s)  g(s) implies f  g.
D1 Non-triviality. There are acts f, g ∈ L s.t. f  g.
D2 Continuity. For any f ∈ L, the sets {g|g  f} and {g|g ≺ f} are open.
D3 Independence. Let f, g ∈ L. f  g if and only if αh + (1− α) f  αh +
(1− α) g for every h ∈ L and α ∈ [0, 1].
D4 Transitivity. ∀f, g, h ∈ L f  g and g  h implies f  h.
16
D5 Complete-transitivity over unambiguous acts. Let y, z, w ∈ Y . ¬z  y
and ¬w  z implies that ¬w  y.
PROOF. Properties D0-D3 are immediately implied by the analog properties
B0-B3. D4 (transitivity) is implied by CARNI (as in lemma 4). D5 is implied
by B5 (WARUP) as follows: assume to the contrary that ¬z  y, ¬w 
z and w  y. This implies that y ∈ C ({y, z}) and y /∈ C ({y, z, w}). If
{w} = C ({y, z, w}) then we get a contradiction to CARNI (z ∈ C ({z, w})⇒
z ∈ C ({y, z, w})). Thus z ∈ C ({y, z, w}), and this implies by WARUP that
y ∈ C ({y, z, w}) and we get a contradiction.
The following proposition shows that  has a unique multiple-prior represen-
tation. The proposition is a direct adaptation of the result of Ok et al. for weak
preference a la Bewely ([6]). The proof, which is very similar to [31, Sect. 6],
is omitted.
Proposition 7 Let  be a strict binary relation over L. The following are
equivalent:
(1)  satisﬁes axioms D0-D5.
(2) There exists a unique (up to linear transformations) non-degenerate vN-
M utility u, and a unique convex and closed set P of priors over the state
of nature, such that for every two acts f, g ∈ L:
f  g ⇔ ∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) > Ep (u (g))
We use Prop. 7 to ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 2, by showing that axioms B0-
B5 are suﬃcient for the belief-justiﬁcation representation. Let C be a choice
correspondence that satisﬁes these axioms, and let  be the revealed strict
preference. Let u be the unique (up to linear transformations) utility, and let
P be the unique convex and closed set of priors of Prop. 7. We have to show
for each f ∈ A ⊆ L, f ∈ C (A)⇔ ∃p ∈ P, s.t. Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) ∀g ∈ A.
This is done as follows:
f ∈ C (A)⇐⇒∀g ∈ conv(A) ¬g  f (6)
⇐⇒∀g ∈ conv(A) ∃p ∈ P such that p · u (f) ≥ p · u (g) (7)
⇐⇒ min
g∈conv(A)
max
p∈P
(p · u (f)− p · u (g)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒max
p∈P
min
g∈conv(A)
(p · u (f)− p · u (g)) ≥ 0 (8)
⇐⇒∃p ∈ P such that ∀g ∈ conv(A), p · u (f) ≥ p · u (g) (9)
⇐⇒∃p ∈ P such that ∀g ∈ A, p · u (f) ≥ p · u (g)
Where (6) is implied by (5), (7) is due to Prop. 7, (8) is implied by a by Sion's
Minimax Theorem ([40]), and (9) is implied by the linearity of u.
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